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INTRODUCTION

When one speaks of the New World Order the idea that the banana could
play a major role in its final configuration is probably far from thought. The
concept that the banana could compromise the final implementation of the
Single European Market or even undermine the integrity of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is likely to emit chuckles, rather
than pangs of concern. However, the banana has proven itself to be a major
player on the world stage.
In February of 1993, the European Union (EU), after five years of
procrastination, made an attempt at settling what had become a complex and
thorny issue - how to regulate the banana trade in the EU in a way
consistent with the Single Market.' The problem was that some members
imported bananas solely from their former colonies in order to guarantee
those developing countries a market for their bananas.2 Meanwhile, other
countries, who were not bound to former colonies, bought cheaper bananas
from Latin American producers who had modem and cost-efficient banana
industries.
Also contributing to the EU's problems were conflicting treaty
* General Counsel for TransMarine Management Company, Tampa, FL. MBA and J.D.
University of Florida. The author would like to thank his parents, family, and friends for all
the support they have shown over the years.
1. Council Regulation 404/93, art. 12, 1993 O.J. (L47) [hereinafter Banana Regime].
2. See RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 226 (1992).
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obligations. The Treaty of Rome guaranteed Germany unimpeded access to
bananas while the Lom6 Convention and the Accession Treaties of Portugal
and Spain guaranteed territories and former colonies preferential treatment
with regard to their banana exports. 3 Moreover, EU obligations under
GATT provided that all contracting parties, including five Latin American
banana producing countries, would be given "most-favored-nation" status in
regards to trade with the EU.4 Thus, GATT obligated the EU to deny
preferential treatment to any country at the expense of Latin American
countries.5
The EU's regulation of the banana trade could potentially result in
displacing hundreds of thousands of workers, devastating the political and
economic structure of some nations, and compromising EU integrity in
regards to honoring treaty obligations. This paper attempts to take a closer
look at these concerns. First, a factual summary of the events leading up to
the banana controversy will familiarize the reader with the present situation
concerning the EU and its banana trading partners.
Subsequent to the factual summary is a closer look at the players
involved in the banana controversy: the Atlantic, Caribbean and Pacific
countries that make up the former colonies of the EU; the eight banana
producing countries from Central and South America that will be called the
Latin American producers; and, the EU which is subdivided among those
favoring and those against the EU's new banana regime. Next, is a summary
of the laws that are involved in the controversy. These include the "Banana
Protocol" of the Treaty of Rome, the Single European Act, the Lom6
Convention, the New Banana Regime, and GATT. This is followed by an
analysis of how these laws either conflict or comport to EU actions.
In conclusion, this paper suggests that no unilateral action could reconcile
the problems faced by all the countries involved. Rather, the best choice is
real negotiation and compromise, because the consequences of obstinance
will only prove to be costly to all.
II.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On February 13, 1993, the European Union agreed to new banana import
rules that took affect on July 1, 1993.6 The EU, the world's largest importer

3. William Dullforce, EC Tries to Straighten Out Banana Problem, FIN. TIMES LTD.,
Oct. 18, 1990, at 38.
4. Id.
5. 4 GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 1-78 (1969), at 1; 61 Stat. All,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T. S. 187, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BDIEL File
[hereinafter GATT].
6. Bruce Barnard, EC Leaders Work on Trade Policy on Eve of Talks with U.S., Japan,
J. CoM., June 21, 1993, at 3A; Banana Regime, supra note 1, art. 18.
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of bananas,7 had been avoiding this decision since 1986.8 The EU had to
reconcile regulating the banana market consistent with its Single Market,
while at the same time honoring its commitment in the Lom& Convention
with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries that banana exports
would be protected; honoring the "Banana Protocol" in the Treaty of Rome
guaranteeing Germany unimpeded access to bananas; honoring the Accession
Treaties and Spanish and Portuguese interests in protecting the banana
exports of the Canaries and Madeira; 9 and, honoring its obligations under the
Uruguay Round of GATT, where opening markets in industrialized countries
to products from developing countries was a crucial objective.'
The result was a new banana regime that, consistent with the Single
Market, uniformly enforces all tariffs and quotas throughout Europe."
However, this effectively stripped Germany of its guarantee of unimpeded
access to bananas as put forth in the Treaty of Rome. 2 In order to honor
its commitments to the ACP banana producing countries, the new regime
allows duty-free importation up to 30% of all European banana consumption. 3 Latin American bananas, on the other hand, which are cheaper
and arguably tastier,' 4 are limited to two million tons per year with a 20%
tariff.15 Anything above this level is subject to a 170% tariff.' 6 These
regulations are to prevent the devastation of those ACP economies which
heavily rely on the European banana market.' 7 The preferential treatment
accorded the ACP is also extended to the Canaries and Madeira, bringing the
new banana regime in line with the Accession Treaties for Spain and
Portugal.' 8 Finally, the EU hoped the new banana regime would be exempt
from GATT due to the EU's prior, and consequently overriding, obligations
concerning the ACP countries. 9
Reaction to the new banana regime was swift and strong. In an attempt

7. Dullforce, supra note 3. As of 1988, Europe was absorbing almost 37% of worldwide
banana exports. Id.
8. Id.
9. David Gardner, The European Market: Bananas Put Community's Honour at Stake
- Brussels Faces One ofits Toughest Quota Decisions Tomorrow, FIN. TIMES LIMITED, Apr.
6, 1992, at 3.
10. Dullforce, supra note 3.
11. Banana Regime, supra note 1, art. 1.
12. Barnard, supra note 6.
13. Bruce Barnard & Miriam Widman, Court Backs EC Controls on Latin Bananas;
Germans Say Curbs to Hike Prices, Unemployment, J. COM., June 30, 1993, at 1A.
14. Miriam Widman, Banana Ban Hurts Ports, J. COM., Sept. 20, 1993, at 7A.
15. Barnard & Widman, supra note 13.
16. Id.
17. Canute James, U.S. Position on EC Banana Quotas Angers Leaders of Caribbean
Nations, J.CoM., July 26, 1993, at 4A.
18. Banana Regime, supra note 1, art 12.
19. Gardner, supra note 9.
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to prevent introduction of the new regime, Germany challenged the banana
regime in the European Court of Justice.2" Germany argued that the new
regime circumvents the "banana protocol" of the Treaty of Rome that
guarantees Germany free access to bananas. 2 ' On June 30, 1993, the Court
rejected Germany's challenge, 22
clearing the way for the new regime the day
effect.
into
go
to
was
it
before
Also reacting to the new banana regime were the Latin American banana
producing nations,23 five of which were contracting members of GATT.24
These countries called on the GATT Council to implement a dispute panel
to investigate and rule on the legality of the new banana regime.25 The
Latin American countries argued that the EU's banana regime was incompatible with GATT and discriminatory. Three months earlier, another GATT
dispute panel (First Panel) had condemned the former banana regime under
the Lom6 Convention as contrary to international trade rules. 26 The First
Panel stated that the benefits of the EU's banana policy were restricted to a
small group of countries, consequently discriminating against a larger number
of third-world nations. 27 At the same time, the Latin American banana
producers were calling on GATT to adopt the First Panel ruling as well as
rule on the new regime.2"
The EU countered by arguing that the First Panel's decision was no
29
longer valid as it dealt only with the old banana regime, not the new one.
The GATT Council apparently agreed, as pleas from Latin American banana
producers for the GATT Council to adopt the First Panel's report went
unheeded. Rather, the GATT Council agreed to allow a new dispute panel

20. Barnard, supra note 6. Germany was.apparently aware that the resulting banana
regime was a likelihood as evidenced by their resistance to the efforts of the other EC
members to protect the more expensive ACP bananas. Terence Roth, German Cravingsfor
Cheap Bananas Threaten to Lead to a Trade Clash, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1992, at A5b, col.
1.
21. Barnard, supra note 6.
22. Barnard & Widman, supra note 13. Also unsuccessful was an action by German
banana importers claiming that they would lose half their business because 30% of the import
licenses were awarded to traditional importers of ACP bananas. Id.
23. These nations include Colombia, Honduras, Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Ivannia Mora, Commodities: Latin American Banana Meeting
Ends in Failure,Inter Press Serv. Jan. 13, 1994, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, IPS File.
24. Second GATT Panel Report Criticizes EU's Banana Import Tariff-Quota Regime,
BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Jan. 28, 1994, available in WestLaw, DIALOG Lib., BNA Daily
News File [hereinafter EC Criticized].
25. Latin American Nations Ask GATT to Adopt Panel Report on EC Banana, 10 INT'L
TRADE RE'. 1255 (1993) [hereinafter Panel Adoption].
26. Barnard & Widman, supra note 13; Panel Rules Against EC Members' Restrictions
on Bananas, Focus GATT NEWSL., July 1993, at 2-4 [hereinafter Panel Ruling].
27. Panel Ruling, supra note 26, at 2.
28. PanelAdoption, supra note 25, at 1255.
29. Id.
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(Second Panel) to look into the Latin American producer's new
complaints.3 ° The Second Panel report was scheduled to be made available
to the conflicting parties at GATT's annual meeting in mid-January of
1994. 3'
In an attempt to head off the Second Panel report, the EU made the Latin
American countries a compromise offer. 2 The offer consisted of a 100,000
ton increase in 1994 and a 200,000 ton increase in 1995 over the original two
million ton annual quota.3 3 The offer was non-negotiable and conditional
on the Latin American producers dropping the ongoing GATT dispute prior
to release of the Second Panel report.3 4 Four of the five Latin American
GATT members appeared to be leaning towards accepting the offer.35
However, as the release date of the report drew closer and with Guatemala
and three non-GATT Latin American nations refusing to accept the offer,36
support for the compromise quickly diminished.37
Like the First Panel report, the Second Panel report also condemned the
EU banana import regime.38 The Second Panel report concluded that the
tariff rates imposed on Latin American bananas exceed the GATT obligation
not to exceed tariffs by greater than 20%." 9 The Panel also concluded that
the tariff system discriminated against Latin American producers, since the
ACP countries' banana exports entered the EU duty-free. 4' The Panel
called on the EU to amend the banana import regulations so as to not

30. GATT Receives Membership Applications From Armenia, Latvia, Moldova, Ukraine,
10 INT'L TRADE REP. 2138 (1993) [hereinafter Membership Applications].
31. Latin Americans Win GATT Ruling on EU Banana Quota, Reuter Economic News,
Jan. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
32. Debra Percival, EC Awaits Latin American Seal of Approval On Bananas, Inter Press
Serv., Dec. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IPS File.
33. Banana Industry Faces CollapseFollowing EC Decision, Latin American Intelligence
Report, Dec. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File [hereinafter Industry
Collapse].
34. Mora, supra note 23.
35. Debra Percival, EC Renews Bid for Full Latin American Accord on Banana Deal,
Inter Press Serv., Jan. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IPS File.
36. Mora, supra note 23.
37. David Carrasco, Bananas: UBEC Head Denies Division Among Exporter Countries,
Inter Press Service, Jan. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IPS File.
38. Stephanie Nebehay, Latin Americans Win New GA TT Ruling on EUBananas, Reuter
General News, Jan. 19,'1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
39. Guatemala Confirms that EU Banana Import Regime Contravenes GAIT, Agence
Europe, Feb. 15, 1994, available in WestLaw, DIALOG Lib., Agence File (Agence Europe's
sources for this were Guatemalan authorities and not the actual text) [hereinafter GATT
Contravened]. Legal details of the report were not made available to the press. On January
18, the second panel report was released only to the conflicting parties. A 60 day waiting
period before making the report public is provided to the conflicting parties. This is to
provide for time so that the conflicting parties are given a chance to hopefully negotiate a
settlement. EC Criticized,supra note 24.
40. GA IT Contravened,supra note 39.
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contravene GATT obligations.4
The EU responded to the Second Panel report by withdrawing the
compromise offer and rejecting the Panel's conclusions.4" The EU stated
that the Second Panel report was unacceptable due to the dire political and
economic consequences it would cause the ACP countries if the EU opened
its market to less expensive Latin American bananas.43 The EU argued that
its commitments to the ACP countries under the Lom6 Convention do not
permit it to turn its back on the ACP countries." Banana exports are the
mainstay of many of-the ACP countries and the loss of the European market
to these countries would be devastating."
This is how the situation presently stands. The EU has stated that even
though the compromise offer has been withdrawn there is still room for
discussion.46 There is increasing pressure within the EU itself to increase
the quotas or to take whatever steps are necessary to avoid contravening
GATT obligations. 47 The ACP countries are protesting that any compromise is certain to result in financial and political turmoil in their nations.48
The Latin American producers are also arguing that the financial and political
stakes are just as high for their developing economies as it is for the ACP
countries. 49 As of February 11, 1994, the Second Panel report was
confidentially released to all GATT parties.50 If no compromise is achieved
by mid-March, the GATT Council must rule on whether to adopt the Second
Panel ruling.5

41. EC Criticized, supra note 24.
42. Alison Maitland, Commissioner Rejects GATI Attack on EU Banana Regime, FIN.
TIMES LIMITED, Feb. 23, 1994, at 34. As of Feb. 22, 1994, the European Commission had
not formally informed GATT that it rejected the second panel report. GATT: Steichen Says
European Union Rejects GATT Report on Banana Import Regime, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. 8 d29
(1994).
43. Maitland, supra note 42, at 34.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Germany Urges EU to Increase Banana Import Quota, The Reuter European
Community Report, Feb. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File; EU Court
to Decide on German Banana Complaint Aug. 20, AFP-Extel News Limited, Mar. 8, 1994,
available in WestLaw, Dialog Library, Agence France Press File (Germany's new challenge
to EU import limitations on South American bananas to be ruled on August 20, 1994.)
48. Industry Collapse, supra note 33; Caribbean:Low Banana Prices Threaten Regional
Economies, Inter Press Serv., Jan. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IPS File.
49. See Carrasco, supra note 37 (stating that the economies and tens of thousands of
employees' jobs of the Latin American banana producing countries directly depend on the
banana industry).
50. Switzerland: GATT Says EU Banana Tariffs Unfair, Urges Reform, Reuter Economic
News, Feb. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
51. EC Criticized, supra note 24.
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A.

The Atlantic, Caribbean and Pacific Countries

The Atlantic, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries are sixty-nine in
number.52 These countries' trade with the EU is governed by the Lom6
Convention. 3 The EU grants these countries preferential trading status due
to their former colonial status.54 For most of these developing nations, this
arrangement is important to their economic and political survival. 55
Of these sixty-nine countries, at least eight Caribbean and African
countries are considered to have significant banana producing industries.56
Prior to the new banana regime, 46% of the bananas consumed by the EU
came from ACP countries and EU territories.57 Under the new regime as
put in place on July 1, 1993, this amount was reduced to 30%.58 The EU
compromise offer, that was rejected by the Latin American countries, would
have reduced this even more.5 9 The Latin American countries are calling
for the banana market in Europe to be opened up with no preferences

52. The ACP countries include: Angola, Barbudo, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin,
Botswana, Burkino Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Congo, Cote d' Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabonese Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwandese Republic, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tom6 and Principe, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somali, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Togolese Republic, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Samoa, Zaire,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6, Dec. 15, 1989, List of
Signataries, Treaty Series No. 47 (1992) Cm 1999 (Eng.), 29 I.L.M. 788 (entered into force
Sept. 1, 1991) [hereinafter Lome IV].
53. FOLSOM, supra note 2, at 227.
54. Id. at 226. The EC has endeavored to sustain the special trading and development
preferences that come from colonial status, even as most of the colonies gained independence.
This is shown by Part IV of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the Yaound6 Conventions of 1964
and 1971, and the Lom6 Conventions. Id.
55. The Dominican Prime Minister stated "[i]f we lost the industry, we would lose the
country. It would be the beginning of despair." The EC recognizes that if protective
measures against the Latin America bananas are not maintained the ACP banana producers
would be "wiped out." Gardner, supra note 9, at 3.
56. Specific banana producers that have voiced the most concern over the banana regime
are Belize, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, Jamaica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon and
Somalia. Debra Percival, Commodities-Bananas:EC Fails to Answer Caribbeans Cry for
Help, Inter Press Service, Feb. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IPS File.
57. Starla Henrichs-Cohen, EEC Treaty Article 1157-- The Surviving Safeguard: Ridding
Residual Member State Protection in the Single Market, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 553,
2b(iv) (1993).
58. Widman, supra note 14, at 7A.
59. See Colin Narbrough, EC Backs Down Over Bananas, THE TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1993 (the
300,000 ton increase in the Latin American quota would consequently decrease the percentage
of the EC market allocated to the ACP countries).
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whatsoever.6 °
The ACP countries are very fearful of the proposed Latin American
scenario.6 ' Unlike the industrial efficiency characteristic of Latin American
banana producers, the ACP banana producing countries have significantly
smaller farms with much higher costs of production.62 Consequently, if
forced to compete with Latin American producers without the preferential
treatment of the Lom6 Convention, the ACP countries warn that their banana
production industries will be wiped out. 63 For some of these 64countries,
economic and political stability is reliant on their banana exports.
B.

The Latin American Banana Producing Countries

Latin American banana producing countries viewed the fall of the Berlin
Wall as the beginning of the "Banana Revolution" - the opening up of
major markets that would help the Latin America region emerge from one of
its worst slumps in agricultural exports. 65 The banana producing countries
of Latin America that presently export to the EU include Colombia,
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, and
Ecuador.66 Of these eight, the first five are GATT members.67 Similar to
the ACP countries, the Latin American banana producing countries are also
considered southern hemisphere developing countries. 68 Like the ACP,

60. Enrique Betancourt, executive director of the Union of Banana Exporting Countries,
stated that "[w]hat we are against is anything that discriminates against us." David Carrasco,
Bananas: UBEC Head Denies Division Among Exporter Countries, Inter Press Service, Jan.
20, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IPS File.
61. Trade: ACP BananaProducersAnxious After GA TT PanelFindings,Inter Press Serv.,
Jan. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IPS File [hereinafter ACP Anxious]; see
Percival, supra note 56.

62. Dullforce, supra note 3, at 38. Production costs are much higher for ACP banana
producers than Latin American banana producers where banana plantations are generally larger
than 12,000 acres. Most of the ACP banana farms are rarely as large as two acres. Id.
63. Andrew Griffith, UK: City'Suppliers of Bananas Fight for Markets, DAILY
Feb. 11, 1994, at 24. The Dominican Prime Minister stated that the preferential-

TELEGRAPH,

treatment of ACP banana exports is a "condition of survival." Id.
64. Gardner, supra note 9, at 3 (lobbyists for Caribbean banana producers warn of a Haitilike breakdown resulting in these nations becoming attractive to drug traffickers).
65. Nathaniel Sheppard, Jr., Expected Banana Export Boom Turns into Bust for Central
America; EC Quotas Add Stiff Tariffs, J. COM., Aug. 3, 1993, at 5A.
66. Mora, supra note 23.
67. Id.
68. See Douglas E. Matthews, Lom6 IV and ACP/EEC Relations: Surviving the Lost
Decade, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 10-14 (1991-92). Matthews explains that the moder-

nizationist school views economic development as occurring in common stages from an
agrarian to an industrial economy. Id. Developing countries, as opposed to non-developed
or developed countries, are still primarily agrarian. See ld. Ninety-five percent of the world's
bananas are produced in developing countries. Dullforce, supra note 3, at 38.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss1/7
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agricultural exports are the primary source of economic stability.69 Banana
exports have become even more significant in regards to economic strength,
as the prices for other Central American commodities, such as coffee and
sugar, have plummeted on the world market.70
The disparity of Latin American production costs with the ACP is due
to capital investments by multinational corporations in the Latin American
banana industry.7' Due to the significant investment and the traditional
presence of these multinationals, Latin American plantations are much larger
than those of the ACP and significantly more
efficient.72 Consequently, the
73
less.
costs of production are considerably
Latin American countries point out that the presence of such great
production resources is of no value if they are deprived of the full utility of
their productive capability. 74 Jobs and economic gain can only be realized
if the production capability can be utilized.75 Consequently, Latin American
countries warn that hundreds of thousands of jobs stand to be lost 76 and
economic health is certain to be compromised if the new banana regime is
not altered.77

69. Sheppard, supra note 65 (decreasing revenues from agricultural exports have
weakened economic and political conditions in this region).
70. Id.
.71. Colin Narbrough, The Great EuropeanBananaSplit, THE TIMES, Mar. 3, 1993 (Latin
American plantations are largely owned by multi-national American fruit companies). The
capital investment by the multinationals has resulted in large-scale plantations in Latin
America that provide cost economies. EC 1992: Who Will Be Top Banana? Market Policy
of European Community's 1992 Single Internal Market Initiative May Transform Tropical
Produce Industry; U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service Report, AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK, July, 1991, at 17 [hereinafter DOA Report].
72. Dullforce, supra note 3, at 38 (see text accompanying note 57 regarding the size of
Latin American banana plantations).
73. DOA Report, supra note 71, at 17.
74. See Carrasco, supra note 37 (despite the sophistication of the banana industry, the
economic consequences due to restrictions would be significant).
75. Id.
76. Griffith, supra note 63, at 24. The Latin American banana producers claim that a
100,000 jobs have already been lost due to the new banana regime. Id. Enrique Betancourt,
executive director of the Union of Banana Exporting Countries stated that the "immediate
impact will be the loss of 6,000 jobs of principal breadwinners, followed by the furlough of
52,000 workers and the ripple effect on 104,000 workers providing support services."
Sheppard, supra note 65, at 5A.
77. See Sheppard, supra note 65, at 5A. The economies of the Latin American banana
producers are debt-ridden. Consequently, they are being pressured by international creditors
to liberalize and open markets by eliminating protectionist barriers and privatizing enterprises.
These countries warn that losing 400,000 tons of exports to the EC will have a detrimental
impact on countries that are already suffering a weakened economic and political condition.
Id.
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The European Union

The European Union does not stand united on the provisions of the new
banana regime.7 8 It is only through a narrow majority that the new regime
was passed.7 9 On the other hand, there is a significant minority that is
siding with the Latin American countries and GATT on the legality of the
new banana regime.8 0 Such a split was to be expected, considering the
conflicting obligations that the various members of the EU brought with them
when coming together as a single market.8 ' Further, as a group, GATT
membership is seen as a potential key to realizing the EU's role as a global
trader. However, GATT membership carries with it conflicts with other trade
treaties that must be dealt with.82
Prior to the new banana regime, Germany, under the "banana protocol"
of the Treaty of Rome, had been guaranteed unimpeded access to bananas.83
This translated into no quotas or tariffs placed on German imports of
bananas.' Virtually all the bananas consumed in Germany came from Latin
not only found these bananas cheaper than
American countries.8 5 Germans
86
tastier.
also
but
ACP bananas,
Banana importation is a significant industry in Germany. The demand
for bananas in Germany had seen significant growth in the past few years. 87
With the approaching Single Market, and with it the removal of internal
barriers, German importers believed that the rest of the EU would share their

78. Commodities-Bananas: EC Is Split Over "Final"Latin American Offer, Inter Press
Service, Jan. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IPS File [hereinafter Final Split];
Germany Urges EU to Increase Banana Import Quota, Reuter European Community Report,
Feb. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File [hereinafter Increase Urged].
79. Narbrough, supra note 71. It took the British vote to form the crucial majority to outvote the Germans, the Belgians and the Dutch. Id.
80. Id.; Final Split, supra note 78; Increase Urged, supra note 78.
81. Gardner, supra note 9, at 3.
82. The EC commission was forced to reconcile the various regimes of the different EC
members in a way consistent with GATT obligations, one of which is the Uruguay Round
obligation to liberalize restrictions on tropical products. Duliforce, supra note 3, at 38.
83. DOA Report, supra note 71, at 17.
84. Id.
85. Roth, supra note 20, at A5B.
86. Germans say they get the best bananas in all of Europe due to their importing of Latin
American bananas. Id.
87. German consumption of bananas, already the highest in Europe, has seen significant
increases every year since the fall of the Berlin Wall due to the enormous appetite for bananas
of the East Germans who averaged 25 kilos per head in 1992. Narbrough, supra note 71.
Before the implementation of the new banana regime German imports of bananas were at
$843 million a year. Doug Harper, Banana Regulations Split the European Community, J.
COM., Oct. 22, 1993, at llA.
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preference for Latin American bananas.88 Presumably in anticipation of
this, German importers enlarged facilities at their ports, including the
construction of a new fruit terminal at the Port of Rostock.8 9 Since the
implementation of the new banana regime, German importers have shut down
these new facilities and laid off thousands of workers. 90
German business leaders argue that the new banana regime will severely
handicap the banana industry. The 2 million ton annual quota on Latin
American bananas will result in Germany importing less bananas from Latin
America than it had imported for its own consumption needs in past years. 9'
Germany argues that this lack of an adequate supply and the new regime's
inclusion of new quotas and tariffs on German imports of Latin American
Bananas is certain to raise prices.92 Consequently, demand will decrease
resulting in a further loss of jobs. 93 Supporting the German anti-regime
position are Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.94
Support for the new regime was led by France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and
the United Kingdom.95 These countries supported quotas and tariffs on
Latin American imports in order to protect former colonies in the Caribbean
and Africa that were developing banana industries. 96 The pro-regime
countries fear that removal of ACP protective measures on banana imports
will result in the devastation of these developing industries. 97 In countries
that are struggling to achieve economic stability, the consequences are
potentially catastrophic and long-term. 98
88. German fruit importers were investing in anticipated growth with one example of their
activities including a $17.7 million dollar investment in the banana terminal at the Bremerhaven port. This project has been put on hold due to the new banana regime. Widman, supra
note 14, at 7A.
89. See Miriam Widman, Germans: EC Banana Rule Not as Bad as Expected, J. COM.,
Nov. 8, 1993, at 4A.
90. Id. (Atlanta AG, one of Germany largest importers, stated that they were closing nine
branch offices, firing 500 workers and pulling out of its majority participation in the new fruit
terminal at the Port of Rostock due to the new banana regime).
91. Widman, supra note 89, at 4A. The new banana regime has resulted in a 50% drop
in the German market share for Latin American bananas. Id.
92. Barnard & Widman, supra note 13. German officials predicted that prices under the
new banana regime could rise by 70%.
93. Id. at IA.
94. Harper, supra note 87, at I IA.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Setting Up the Internal Market in the Banana Sector, SEC (92) 940 final, at 3.1.1.44
[hereinafter Setting Up the Banana Market]. The European Commission realized that if only
a 20% tariff was implemented on Latin American bananas with no quotas. Id.
3.1.1.43.
Community banana production and ACP banana imports would be squeezed out of the market.
Id. 3.1.1.44.
98. See Canute James, Banana Plan Tops Agenda for Gore-CaribbeanTalks, J. COM.,
Sept. 28, 1993, at IOA (Caribbean leaders warn that for some banana producers, the result of
diminished protection in the EC would be the breakdown of social and political stability).
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Treaty of Rome "Banana Protocol"

In 1957, the founding members of the European Union drafted the'Treaty
of Rome.9 9 This established the European Economic Union. 1 ° However,
Konrad Adenauer, the postwar German chancellor, refused to sign the Treaty
of Rome until he secured for Germany a "Banana Protocol."'' While the
other signing members had colonial and territorial interests to protect with
regard to granting preferential treatment, this provision in the Treaty of Rome
guaranteed Germany unimpeded access to any bananas it wished to
import. °2
E.

The European Union Single Market

The Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty)'13 was signed by the six original
Member Nations of the European Union on March 25, 1957. 04 The
eventual goal of the Treaty of Rome was to form a "Single Market" economy
- a trading area with no internal barriers to obstruct the free flow of goods,
services, and capital among Member Nations. 5 In 1985, the European
Commission, realizing that the development of the Single Market had
stagnated, began an ambitious campaign to reinvigorate the drive towards
economic integration." °
Due to this campaign, the Single European Act (SEA) 10 7 was signed in
February 1986 by all twelve Member Nations' and was enacted in July
1987. The objective of the SEA was to achieve a Single Market by
December 31, 1992.109 The SEA amended provisions of the EEC Treaty
99. FOLSOM, supra note 2, at 8.

100. Id.
101. Narbrough, supra note 71.
102. Roth, supra note 20, at A5B.
103. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
104. Id. The member nations were the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, France,
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Id.
105. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY, Supp. 1/87, art. I, first para. (The European Commission
quotes article 2 of the EEC TREATY stating that the EC should encourage the "harmonious
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in
stability [and] an accelerated raising of the standard of living.").
106. William Dawkins, European Vision of Free Common Market Is Back on Course, FIN.
TIMES LIMITED, Dec. 31, 1986, at 2 (discussing the 300-point program adopted by the member
states in order to realize the original goal of "unified economic power").
107. Single European Act, 30 O.J. (L 169) 1 (1987) [hereinafter SEA].
108. Subsequently joining the EC after the Treaty of Rome were: the United Kingdom,
Denmark and Ireland in 1973; Greece in 1981; and Spain and Portugal in 1986. FOLSOM,
supra note 2, at XXIX.
109. "The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the
internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992 .... " SEA, supra note 107,
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in order to enable the EU to expedite the realization of the Single Market.
Among the 300 measures that were scheduled to be dealt with in order
to achieve the Single Market was the elimination of internal frontier
controls,"' ° which consequently required conformity of trade relations with
third parties. No longer are the individual Member Nations able to
independently decide whether to place restrictions on or provide preferential
treatment to imports."' In order for individual Member States to continue
their particular trade policies they will have to persuade the EU to adopt an
EU-wide restraint at levels high
enough to satisfy them," 2 thus creating or
3
barriers."
eliminating external
F. The Fourth Lom6 Convention
The Fourth Lom6 Convention is the continuation of an evolving NorthSouth cooperation between the EU and former colonies that involves cultural,
social, human, environmental, and economic factors." 4 Unique to this
agreement, as compared to prior and contemporaneous North-South relations,
is the highly concessional terms of EU aid to its former colonies, the ACP
countries." 5 Evolving from a past of colonial exploitation is a relationship
that provides development assistance for ACP populations without reciprocal
obligations." 6 The ACP countries are granted substantial duty free access
to the EU while the EU obtains no comparable benefit." 7
Consistent with the spirit of the Lom6 relationship is the Lom6 IV
Protocol 5 on bananas."18 Lom6 IV promises that no ACP State that has
traditionally supplied bananas to the EU will be placed, in regards to the EU
Single Market, in a less favorable position than they presently or previously
have enjoyed." 9 A consequence of this situation is that some of the ACP
countries are economically dependent
on banana exports for a large portion
20
earnings.
currency
hard
their
of

at art. 13-15.

110. Id. art. 6.
111. Farzaneh Marvasti, Comment, The Single EuropeanAct: A ProfitablePerspectiveNot
Only for the European Community, 20 Sw. U. L. REv. 185 (1991).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Lom6 IV, supra note 52.
115. Matthews, supra note 68, Introduction.
116. FOLSOM, supra note 2, at 228.
117. Id.
118. Lom6 IV, supra note 52, at pt. 5, Protocol 5.
119. Id.
120. See FOLSOM, supra note 2, at 229; see James, supra note 98, at 10A. Caribbean
countries criticized the United States for supporting the Latin American position in their

challenge to the new banana regime. The Caribbean countries warned that the United States
was not grasping the potential harm that would result if the region lost its preferential
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The New Banana Regime

2
January 1, 1993 was to mark the arrival of the EU's Single Market.' 1
However, there were still a few obstacles standing in the way of a true single
market, one of which was the lack of a uniform trade policy on banana
imports. 22 In response to this lack of conformity, the EU adopted joint
measures to replace compartmentalized national measures. 23 Due to
interests of Member States, this solution was not arrived at
conflicting
124
easily.
The EU solution, Council Regulation (EEC) 404/93 (the new banana
regime), became effective on July 1, 1993.125 The new banana regime
consisted of five separate titles which established uniform rules on: common
quality and marketing standards; producer's organizations and concentration
mechanisms; assistance; trade with third countries; and other general
provisions. 26 The regulations set out arrangements for the trade of bananas
It established four categories of suppliers:
with third countries. 127
traditional imports from ACP countries; non-traditional imports from ACP
countries; imports from non-ACP countries; and, EU bananas.' 28
Imports of bananas from traditional ACP suppliers entered duty-free up
to the maximum quantity fixed for each traditional supplying country. These
maximums collectively amounted to 857,000 tons. 129 Imports of nontraditional ACP bananas and bananas from third countries were subject to a
tariff quota of 2 million tons. 30 Bananas from ACP countries entered duty
free within this quota,13 ' whereas third country bananas were subject to a
tariff of 100 ECU's per ton. 32 Imports above the tariff quota were subject
to a tariff of 750 ECU's per ton for bananas from ACP countries 133 and up
to 850 ECU's per ton from third countries."'

treatment with regard to banana exports to the EC. "It is clear that the U.S. does not want
our region to become a zone of social and political instability, which is what could happen
if they continue to attack the banana arrangement," said a Dominican official. Id.
121. SEA, supra note 107, art. 13-15.
122. Setting Up the Banana Market, supra note 97, at summary, 1.
123. Banana Regime, supra note 1, art. I.
124. Dullforce, supra note 3, at 38.
125. Banana Regime, supra note 1, art. 19, 1.
126. Id. Titles I-V.
127. Id. Title IV (art. 15-20).
128. Id. art. 15.
129. Id. art. 12, 2.
130. Id. art. 18, 1.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. art. 18, 2.
134. Id.
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19941

H.

GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade

The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has gained a
crucial presence in international trade over the last forty years. One of the
primary goals of GATT is to diminish the presence of protectionist barriers
among contracting parties. 35 The EU, five of the eight Latin American
countries involved in the dispute, 3 6 and forty-one of the sixty-nine ACP
countries are Contracting States to GATT. 13 7 The Latin American parties
have challenged the banana regime of the EU for not being consistent with
European obligations under GATT. 3 Europe and the ACP countries have
countered that the preferences accorded the ACP fall within the exceptions
of GATT. 139 The following is a summary of the Articles that appear
relevant to the dispute concerning the banana regime.
The Latin America nations assert that Articles I, II, III, and XI have been
violated by the new banana regime."4 Article I of GATT provides that
each contracting party must confer "most favored nation" status to all other
contracting parties.' 4' Thus, any "privilege or immunity" conferred by one
contracting party to a product imported from another contracting party must
conferred to similar products of
also be "immediately and unconditionally"
42
parties.1
contracting
other
all
Article II, Schedules of Concessions, obligates a contracting party to
charge no more than its currently agreed maximum tariff rates on imports
from other contracting parties. 43 These tariff rates are the product of
135. RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BusINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A NUTSHELL

152 (4th ed. 1992).
136. Of the eight Latin American countries involved in the dispute with the EC, Colombia,
Nicaragua, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Guatemala are the only contracting members of GArr.
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Part II - Signatures, Dec. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Extra File.
137. The following ACP countries are contracting members of GATT: Barbados, Belize,
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo,
Cote d'lvoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Gabonese Republic, Gambia, Ghana,
Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Niger, Nigeria, Rwandese Republic, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Suriname,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togolese Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. Id.
138. Report of the Panel on "EEC - Import Regime for Bananas," DS38/R, Jan. 18, 1994,
17 [hereinafter Second Panel].
139. Id. at 18.
140. Id. at 17.
141. GAIT, supra note 5, at art. I.
142. Id. Article I states "any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties." Id.
143. Id. art. II.
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GATT negotiations'" and are found in each contracting party's
Schedule.145 Provision 4 of Article I1, National Treatment on Internal
Taxation and Regulation, establishes an obligation to accord imported
products competitive opportunities no less favorable than those accorded to
domestic products.'"
Article XI refers to the general elimination of quantitative restrictions.'4 7 Quantitative restraints on the trade of contracting parties, such as
quotas placed on the Latin American bananas, are generally prohibited. 4 '
149
As with other GATT obligations, however, there are certain exceptions.
Two exceptions to Article XI are stated in Articles XI:2(c)(i) and
XXIV. 50 Article XI:2(c)(i) permits quantitative restrictions on agricultural
products if they are necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures
aimed at restricting quantities of like domestic products from being marketed
or produced.''
Article XXIV relates to an exception to the most favored nation principle
52
through the implementation of customs unions and free trade areas.
Article XXIV calls for the removal of virtually all trade restrictions between
territories involved in a customs union or free trade area, thus allowing
53
preferential treatment among countries within a union or free trade area.1
The EU argued that Part IV of GATT justified the EU's exemption from
Article I with regard to the Lom6 Convention and the new banana
regime."M Part IV attempts to deal with the trade disparity between the
developing and the developed world. 15 One aspect of the approach of Part
IV is the articulation of a doctrine of "diminished expectations of reciprocity
for others after the period."' 56 This is intended to result in the creation of

144. Kenneth W. Abbott, Introduction- Regulation of InternationalTrade, The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 3 (CCH 1989).
145. GATT, supra note 5, art. II, 1.
146. Id. art. III, 4.
147. Id. art. XI.
148. Id. Article XI, paragraph 1 provides that
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product
of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export
of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.

Id.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See Id. art. XI, 2, arts. XII-XV and XVIII(B).
Id. art. XI, 2(c)(i) and art. XXIV.
Id. art. XI, 2(c)(i).
Id. art. XXIV.
Id.
Second Panel, supra note 138, 32.
FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 135, at 153-54.
Id.
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additional obligations for developing nations, other than those accorded in
other parts of GATT.'57 The legal basis of Part IV for according tariff
preferences in favor of developing nations was the Enabling Clause under
which falls the Generalized System of Preferences. 5 8 This system was
intended to benefit all developing parties.'59
The GATT "escape clause," Article XIX, permits contracting parties to
restrict, under specified conditions, even fairly traded imports that cause or
threaten serious injury to competing domestic producers.' 6 A country
invoking Article XIX must consult with its trading partners and GATT upon
request and may agree to compensatory concessions or reciprocal restrictions.1 6' It may, however, impose restrictions even if no agreement is
reached. 62
The affected
countries may then suspend "substantially
163
equivalent concessions."'
III.

ANALYSIS

One obstacle that the EU had to deal with was the Treaty of Rome's
"Banana Protocol."'" If the new banana regime was to continue to accord
protection to domestic and ACP bananas, the Treaty of Rome, guaranteeing
that Germany would be accorded unimpeded access to bananas, would have
to be overruled. 65 A single market without internal barriers, continued
protection of ACP countries, and continued German access to unlimited dutyfree bananas were viewed by the European Commission as being irreconcilable.' '6 The Commission believed that anything less than the tariff quota
could spell disaster for domestic and traditional ACP suppliers. 67 The
Council, acting by a qualified majority, decided to abolish Germany's
banana
68
protocol.
banana
the
within
provision
a
to
guarantee pursuant
However, there was no such provision allowing for the abolishment of
the banana protocol within Lom6 IV. Lom6 IV provides that no ACP State
that has traditionally supplied bananas to the EU will be placed, with regards

157. Id.
158. Id.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
GATT, supra note 5, art. XIX.
Id. art. XIX, 2.
Id. art. XIX, 3.
Id.

164. DOA Report, supra note 71, at 17.

165. Setting Up the Banana Market, supra note 97, 41(a).
166. Id. In the Commission's report on possible solutions to the banana trade problem, it
stated that under any possible solution, decompartmentalizing the market accompanied by continued protection of domestic and ACP banana producers can only occur if Germany's zeroduty quota is eliminated. Id.
167. See Id. % 12(e), 14(0, & 44.
168. Id. 21.
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to the EU Single Market, in a less favorable situation than they had
previously enjoyed. 69 In order to comply with this promise, the new
banana regime exempts traditional ACP suppliers from custom duties. 7 '
At the same time, non-ACP countries are subject to quantitative restrictions. 71 The result being a virtual guaranteed market for ACP bananas.
These assurances were not enough to soothe ACP fears of diminished
protection.'72 Inconsistent with the Lom6 IV guarantee is the new quota
on ACP bananas. 73 The ACP countries had enjoyed an exemption from
quantitative restrictions. The new banana regime limits traditional ACP
banana suppliers to 857,700 tons of duty-free imports.174
The ACP
countries are fearful that the 2 million ton quota on non-ACP imports is not
enough to guarantee ACP countries a market large enough to consume
857,700 tons of bananas. 175 Of even greater concern is the proposed EU
compromise with Latin America that would allow another 300,000 tons of
non-ACP bananas into the European market at a 100 ECU's per ton tariff.
The ACP argues that these actions are inconsistent with the spirit of Lom6.
A primary goal of the new banana regime was to set up an internal
banana market consistent with a single market economy. 76 Consequently,
this meant a banana market in which no internal barriers would obstruct the
free flow of bananas among member nations. " 7 In accord with this goal,
the new banana regime replaced various national banana import systems with
a single uniform system.' 78 Also consistent with the single market was the
fact that no longer were individual nations able to independently place
restrictions on or show preferences to particular imports. 179 Any changes
in banana regulations necessarily
had to be adopted by the EU and
80
implemented union-wide.

Another concern of the EU was dealing with the banana market under

169.
170.
171.
172.

Lom6 IV, supra note 52, pt. 5, Protocol 5.
See Banana Regime, supra note 1, at art. 12, 18.
Id. art. 18.
ACP Anxious, supra note 61; see Percival, supra note 56.

173. Banana Regime, supra note 1, art. 12.
174. Percival, supra note 56.

175. See Id. ACP countries are concerned that the regime is not enough as there is already
oversupply.
176. Banana Regime, supra note 1,I (in the recitals of the regulation the Council states,
"Whereas the operation and development of the common market for agricultural products must
be accompanied by the introduction of a common agricultural policy including in particular
a common organization of the agricultural markets which may take different forms depending
on the products ...").
177. See Setting Up the Banana Market, supra note 97, 53.
178. Id.; see also Banana Regime, supra note 1.
179. Banana Regime, supra note 1,art. 21, 1.
180. Id. art. 23, 2.
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GATT. 81 1 Article I, Schedules of Concessions, of GATT prohibited the
application of tariffs for a specific product that were higher than those
specified in each country's Schedule of Concessions.18 2 At the time of
drafting the banana regime, the tariff of 100 ECU's per ton was consistent
with the 20% amount stated in the Schedule of Concessions for agricultural
products. 83 The EU argued that basing the tariff on volume and not value
increased the security and predictability of tariff concessions, thus complying
with the fundamental principles of Article H.'
Latin American countries countered by declaring that both the 100 and
850 ECU's per ton tariffs violated Article II because they were higher than
the 20% amount specified in the Schedule of Concessions. 85 Due to the
tariffs being based on volume and not value and due to the variability of
exchange rates, the 100 ECU's per ton translated into well over 25% ad
valorem. i1 6 The 850 ECU's were eight to nine times higher than those
specified in the Schedule of Tariffs.'87
The Second GATT Panel agreed with the Latin America States that the
tariffs were, either actually or potentially, higher than the specified 20%
amount.'
Therefore, the tariffs applied by the EU under the new banana
regime were found by the Second GATT Panel to be less favorable than that
provided in the EU's Schedule of Concessions. 9 Consequently, the Panel
ruled that the tariffs were inconsistent with the EU's obligations under Article
11.190
Another GATT provision posing a potential conflict for the banana
regime is Article XI, entitled "General Elimination of Quantitative Restric92
tions."' 9' This article prohibits import bans or import restrictions.
Latin American States argued that the tariff quotas of the banana regime
violated this Article as they operated to restrict imports of a product of
another contracting party. 9 3 The tariff quotas amounted to a quantitative
restriction that prevented the continued importation of bananas from Latin

181.
182.
183.
time of
term.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Setting up the Banana Market, supra note 97, Summary, 1.
GATT supra note 5, art. II.
This was due to the exchange rate and the price of bananas from Latin America at the
drafting. However, these are two figures that tend to fluctuate in the short and longSecond Panel, supra note 138, 23.
Id. 24.
Id.
Id.
Id. 134.
Id. 136.
Id.
Id. 17.
GATT, supra note 5, art. XI(I).
Second Panel, supra 138, 54.
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American contracting parties once the 2 million ton threshold had been
reached. 94
The EU countered by arguing that Article XI was never intended to apply
to tariff quotas, regardless of their effect on trade.' 9 There was a fundamental distinction underlying the different legal treatment between tariffs
and quantitative restrictions which had been discussed in the drafting of
Article XI.196
The EU argued that Article XXVIII of the General
Agreement entitled the EU to bind tariffs at a level that it considered
appropriate and subsequently to modify such tariff bindings subject to certain
conditions and procedures pursuant to Article XXVI'.197 The Second
Panel agreed with the EU that the tariff quotas were not inconsistent with
Article XI.' 98
Article III, National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation,
appeared to conflict with the banana regime, specifically provision 4 of the
Article. Article III:4 has been interpreted by previous Panels as establishing
the obligation to accord imported products competitive opportunities no less
favorable than those accorded to domestic products.' 99 The Latin American
parties maintained that the EU acted inconsistent with Article IU:4 by
reserving 30% of the licenses under the tariff quota to operators who
marketed EU or traditional ACP bananas during the preceding period. 2"
The banana regime provides that the quantity of bananas that an operator
may import depends on the origin of the bananas that the operator has
marketed during the preceding three-year period. 20 1 The Latin American
parties argued that this provided operators with an incentive to purchase EU
and ACP bananas rather than Latin American bananas, because this would
enable the operators to obtain a larger share of the tariff quota licenses.20 2
Latin America asserted that this resulted in the distortion of competitive
conditions for the import of bananas.2 3
The EU defended its actions by asserting that the method of allocating
licenses did not adversely affect the competitive conditions for third-country
bananas. 204 The only consequence of operators competing for EU or ACP
bananas in order to increase their share of the quota would be to drive up the

194. Id.
195. Id. 55.
196. Id. 56.
197. Id.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

55.

Id. 138.
Id. 146.
Id. 82.
Banana Regime, supra note 1, art. 19,
Second Panel, supra note 138, 81.
Id. 83.
Id. 84.
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prices of EU and ACP bananas.2 5 The Second Panel found that the system
of allocating tariff quota licenses was not only inconsistent with Article
III:4, but also inconsistent with Article 1: 1.206
The Second Panel ruled that a requirement to purchase a domestic
product in order to obtain the right to import a product at a lower rate of
'duty under a tariff quota is a requirement affecting the purchase of a product
within the meaning of Article 111:4.207 Further, Article I: 1 obliges contracting parties, with respect to all matters referred to in Article III:4, to accord
any advantage, granted to any product originating in any country, to the like
product originating in the territories of all other contracting parties. °8 In
light of this obligation, the Second Panel found that the preferred allocation
of licenses to operators who purchase ACP bananas violated EU obligations
under Article 1: 1.209
The Latin American parties claimed that the banana regime was
inconsistent with the principle of most favored nation treatment under Article
I due to the advantage shown domestic and ACP producers in regards to
tariffs.21 0 While Latin American States were forced to pay 100 ECU's per
ton within the tariff quota of two million tons and 850 ECU's per ton outside
of the tariff quota, a like product from an ACP country was shown a clear
advantage. 21 A fixed quantity of ACP bananas was exempted from the
tariff quota altogether,2 2 further quantities could enter duty free within the
tariff quota,2 13 and any remainder entered under a duty of 750 ECU's per
ton, 100 ECU's per ton less than for the Latin American States.214 The EU
made no argument that the banana regime was not inconsistent with Article
1.2 15 The Panel ruled that since the duty-free tariffs and preferential
customs duties applied to ACP banana imports were not granted immediately
or unconditionally to the like product originating from Latin American GATT
parties, the regulation of banana imports was inconsistent with Article
I:1 .216

The EU contended that the inconsistency with Article I was justified
under the provisions of Article XXIV.217 The EU maintained that the

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. 143.
Id. 146-48.
Id. 146.
Id. 147.
Id.
Id. 29.
Id.
Banana Regime, supra note 1, art. 12,
Id. art. 18, 1.
Id. art. 18, 2.

215. Second Panel, supra note 138,
216. Id.
217. Id.

2.

154.

155.
32.
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Lom6 IV Convention and its predecessors had created a free trade area
between the EU and the ACP countries.218 This free trade area was in
accordance with the criteria and conditions laid down in Article XXIV:8(b),
read in light of Part IV of the General Agreement. 2' 9 Article XXIV:8(b)
defines a free trade area as "a group of two or more customs territories in
which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce ... are
eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in
products originating in such territories. 220
The Latin American parties asserted that it was precisely the language of
Article XXIV that prevented the treatment granted by the EU to the ACP
banana producers. 22' The trade relationship established under the Lom6
Convention was neither a customs union nor a free trade area.222 The
arrangement was a unilateral and non-reciprocal relationship that did not
substantially eliminate all restrictions on the trade between the constituents
of the union or area.223
Article XXIV obligated the constituents to liberalize trade in all of the
constituent territories in order to establish a free trade area.224 Free trade
areas and customs unions established under Article XXIV were designed to
eliminate barriers on "substantially all trade" and to achieve a "close
integration between the economies" of its constituent parties.225 The very
concept of non-reciprocity was fundamentally irreconcilable with the notion
of a free trade area or customs union.226 The Second Panel agreed that the
non-reciprocity of the trade arrangement was substantially different from a
free trade area as defined in Article XXIV:8(b).2 27
The EU countered that the non-reciprocal nature of the Lom6 Convention
was covered by Part IV of the General Agreement.228 In particular, Article
XXXVI:8 limits the right of developed contracting parties to demand
reciprocity from developing contracting parties if such contributions would
be inconsistent with the development of the less-developed contracting
parties.229 Consequently, when Article XXXVI:8 is read together with Article

218. Id. 37.
219. Id.
220. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIV(8)(b).
221. Id. 33.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. FOLSOM, ET AL., supra note 135, at 157-58.
225. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIV(8)(b).
226. Second Panel, supra note 138, 33.
227. Id. 164.
228. Id. 37.
229. Id. 34; GATT, supra note 5, art. XXXVI(8) (stating that developed contracting
parties should not expect reciprocity for commitments they make in trade negotiations with
less-developed contracting parties).
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XXIV:8 it permits the establishment of a free-trade area between developed
and developing countries without immediate reciprocity.230
The Latin American parties were of the view that Part IV could be
invoked as an exception to the requirement of reciprocity only to establish
differences in trade treatment between developed contracting parties and
developing contracting parties, not between two groups of developing
" ' Furthermore, the First Panel had already found that
contracting parties.23
Article XXIV:8 was not intended to permit according preferences that are
inconsistent with the most favored nation principle.232 The Second Panel
held that the drafting history of Part IV also did not support the EU's
argument.233 The authorization of special preferences to developing
countries had been suggested during the negotiations of Part IV, but had not
been included in the final text.2"'
The First Panel had pointed out that the legal basis in Part IV for
according tariff preferences in favor of developing nations was the Enabling
Clause under which falls the Generalized System of Preferences. 23 5 This
system was intended to benefit contracting developing nations.236 Not all
of the ACP countries were contracting parties.237 Consequently, the First
of the non-reciprocity exception was
Panel ruled that the EU's 23interpretation
s
inconsistent with Part IV.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the EU solution can be found in the General Agreement. The
EU, in an attempt to compromise, could implicate GATT Article XIX, the
escape clause. 239 This would permit the EU to back out on GATT concessions if it finds that bananas are being imported into its territory in increased
quantities and under conditions that cause or threaten serious injury to
domestic banana producers. However, this suspension of obligations is only
temporary.2 ° Nevertheless, this would serve to "buy time" for developing
industries that must modernize in order to compete on the international
market.

230. Second Panel, supra note 138, 37.
231. Id. 33.
232. Id.; Report by the Panel on EEC Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas,
D522/R, May 19, 1993, 358 (not yet adopted) (hereinafter First Panel].
233. Second Panel, supra note 138, 162.
234. Id.
235. First Panel, supra note 232, 369.
236. Id. 370.
237. Id.
238. Id. 371.
239. GATT, supra note 5, art. XIX.
240. Id.
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Hopefully, the use of Article XIX with regard to the banana trade would
send the message to Latin American countries that the EU is ready to take
extreme measures to protect the economies of ACP nations. To have an
outright elimination of the protection accorded the fragile ACP economies
would result in unacceptable devastation. However, since Article XIX only
permits temporary relief, it also would signal the EU's understanding that the
banana regime does not represent a valid long term solution.
Consistent with Article XIX, the protection would have to be gradually
eliminated over a period of time. Tariffs and quotas would gradually
diminish until all contracting parties could deal with the EU on a level
playing field. The ACP countries would be given time to modernize and
diversify with eventual loss of protection being their incentive to act.
Hopefully, this would quell Latin American dissatisfaction with the banana
regime.
While the remaining quota tariffs in the short run may be less than Latin
American countries might have hoped for, the long term prospects of the
elimination of all preferential treatment with regard to bananas would make
up for it. Latin American banana producers must realize that it would be
unrealistic to expect the EU to simply dismantle its traditional protection of
the ACP countries overnight. To try to force such a result would likely cost
Latin America more than it could ever gain. The EU could feel forced to
distance itself from GATT. Such a result would hurt all contracting
members, including Latin America. Real compromise is the only viable
solution for all those involved.
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